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“Go Back to the Land!” Negotiating Space,
Framing Governmentality in Lambwe Valley,
Kenya 1954-75
Maureen Malowany, P. Wenzel Geissler, and
Albred Lwoba
Résumé
En 1954, le Lambwe Land Trust a cherché à répondre aux préoccupations
coloniales visant à contenir et contrôler la mouche tsé-tsé et la transmis-
sion de la trypanosomiase africaine (maladie du sommeil) dans vallée de
Lambwe dans l’ouest du Kenya. Il fallait moins de mouches tsé-tsé et plus
d’habitants, moins de brousse et plus de terres agricoles. La création du
Lambwe Valley Settlement Scheme (LVSS) est le reflet de la confiance
qu’on avait dans les années 1950 de pouvoir maîtriser la terre, la nature et
les peuples indigènes. Alors que d’autres régimes au Kenya sont nés d’une
période tendue marquée soit par des litiges fonciers ou par un développe-
This article is part of a larger project built on archival sources and inter-
views funded by The Wellcome Trust, History of Medicine, Research Grant
WT074772MA, Wenzel Geissler, Principal Investigator. The project team
researchers conducted extensive interviews with descendants of the origi-
nal settlers as well as intensive archival searches in the district, provincial
and national archives located in Homa Bay, Kisumu and Nairobi. Many
thanks to the exhaustive search conducted through the Kenya National
Archives, the Kisumu Record Center and the Homa Bay deposits in both
archives by Mary Davies and Michelle Osborne, British Institute of East
Africa (Nairobi) graduate attachees. In the Kisumu Records Center, the
Homa Bay Deposit – DC/HB (Lambwe Valley Settlement Scheme files);
PC/NZA (Provincial files); KW (Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism) and BV
(Ministry of Agriculture) files accessed. In the KNA; DC /KSM (on the
Lambwe Valley Development Scheme and other sleeping sickness files);
P/.NZA (specific disease files; HT (Department of Agriculture – Nyanza);
AVS (trypanosomiasis) BY (Ministry of Health) selected files. Our thanks to
the Canadian Journal of African Studies reviewers for their helpful
comments and suggestions. 
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ment méga économique, le LVSS est beaucoup plus modeste, veillant à ce
que la bonne science et le bon gouvernement vienne à bout de la mouche.
Cet article porte sur ces deux volets. Une première trame narrative
examine le contexte scientifique de la trypanosomiase et du contrôle de
la mouche tsé-tsé dans la région. Une seconde trame porte sur les habi-
tants: les colons africains et les fonctionnaires coloniaux et africains,
représentant les administrations locales, provinciales et nationales,
travaillant à la planification quotidienne. Des disputes et des débats ont
éclatés à propos des droits fonciers et de la gestion foncière entre les repré-
sentants des conseils municipaux africains et de l’État et leurs électeurs
dans le cadre du LVSS. Les documents d’archives démontrent l’apparition
d’une société civile dans cette région éloignée de l’ouest du Kenya, en
dépit d’un pouvoir de plus en plus centralisateur basé à Nairobi. Les
dossiers révèlent des voix et des visions locales alors que des gens ordi-
naires négocient leur vie à l’ombre de la mégascience, du “grand gouver-
nement” et de la grande politique.
Abstract
In 1954, the Lambwe Land Trust sought to address colonial concern to
contain and control tsetse fly and thus the transmission of human
trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) in Lambwe Valley, Western Kenya.
The Valley needed less tsetse, more people; less bush and more farmed
land. Reflecting the confidence of the 1950s to control land, nature, and
people, the Lambwe Valley Settlement Scheme (LVSS) was established.
While other schemes in Kenya grew out of a tense period of land disputes
or mega-economic development, this scheme was much more modest,
ensuring that good science and good government would defeat the fly.
This article elaborates on both. The first narrative examines the scientific
background on trypanosomiasis and tsetse control in this region. The
second focuses on the people: African settlers, colonial and African
bureaucrats, representing district, provincial, and national governments,
engaged in day-to-day planning. Arguments and debates ensued regard-
ing land rights and management, involving local African council and
state representatives with their constituents within the context of the
The title of the article is derived from KRC DN/2/3 Lambwe Settlement
Scheme 8.12.1970-13.10.1972; Minutes of the Lambwe Advisory
Committee, noted as a quotation from President Jomo Kenyatta, in a
speech delivered in Nairobi, 12 December 1964. In other documents, this
phrase was recalled as “take up the land.” Our understanding of “govern-
mentality,” while drawing upon Foucault’s (1991, 2004) ideas of individu-
alizing and aggregating modes of classification, moves beyond the framing
of this process within a state.
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settlement scheme. The archival records demonstrated the evolution of a
civil society in this remote section of Western Kenya, in spite of an
increasingly dominating Nairobi-based government. The records exposed
local voices and local visions as ordinary people negotiated their lives in
the shadow of big science, big government, and big politics.
Introduction
This history of the Lambwe Valley Settlement Scheme (LVSS) is set
within the broader interrogations of historiographical narratives of
disease control, social engineering and land settlement, and the
constructions of government and civil society in Kenya during the
“transition” of the 1950s through to the 1970s. This article grew
out of a more anthropological enquiry into the “middle” people
who worked in vector-borne disease control in Homa Bay and
surrounding areas of Western Kenya – their stories, lives, training,
and associations – documented through interviews. When asked
about sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis), the human disease
transmitted by the tsetse fly, the Dholuo-speaking people related
their sickness stories within a narrative of resettlement in Lambwe
Valley. They, their parents, and relatives, many of whom had been
resident in neighbouring Tanganyika, returned to Lambwe under a
government-sponsored settlement scheme designed for tsetse and
sleeping sickness control. We sought to understand further the
opportunities presented by the LVSS and the responses of the
settlers through the archival records. District, provincial, and
national archival records articulated more than the institutional
rationale for the scheme’s initiation and local realities of gover-
nance and management. We draw upon these records including the
small but revealing deposit of settlers’ responses, grievances, and
activities. Thus, the oral narratives led us to archival texts that
present a land settlement scheme very different from those of the
period in other parts of Kenya or East Africa as the records reveal a
uniquely transforming “colonized” society engaged in a process of
governance with the developing formal state and the customary
local political leadership (Cooper 2005, 148). The administration of
LVSS provided another level of management placed between the
settlers and the formal government offices and officers 
The LVSS was only one of a number of settlement and resettle-
ment schemes of this period designed to address one or another
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challenge of what we call the “land question.” Land acquisition,
ownership, and use have shaped the political, social, and economic
terrain and the historiographical narratives of Kenya from the early
days of the Protectorate to the present day (Harbeson 1971; Berman
and Lonsdale 1992; Kanogo 1987; Mackenzie 2000). The land ques-
tion arises from the two interrelated processes of British colonial-
ism in East Africa. The first is the British conquest and settlement
of the central highlands at the turn of the twentieth century, which
not only displaced the Kikuyu, Embu, Maasai, and other groups and
created land hunger but also framed subsequent Kenyan anticolo-
nial narratives and resistance. The second is colonial developmen-
talism, which from the 1930s would see the Colonial Office and
various colonial administrations focusing on the fully harnessing
nature and increasing productivity of African colonies. Harnessing
nature meant pushing back the frontiers of disease, dealing with
ecological imbalances, and ensuring that African farmers could
increase their production for the market. The Colonial
Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945, which had
provided funding to the colonies to stimulate economic develop-
ment, agriculture, and settlement, led to the 1954 Swynnerton Plan
in Kenya. The Plan supported participation “in the spread of cash
crops and dairy cattle in the African Reserves: and consolidated
private ownership among Kikuyu peasants (Berman and Lonsdale
1992, 459; see also Harbeson 1971). Colonial developmentalism
layered the complexity of the land question and affected the trajec-
tory of colonial economic development in Kenya (Mackenzie 2000;
Tilley 2007).1
The two interrelated processes – of dealing with the land
displacement cause by white settlement and furthering colonial
developmentalism – would spawn a number of settlement and
resettlement schemes in East Africa between 1930s and 1960s. The
Mau Mau conflict and the ensuing State of Emergency of the 1950s
would add urgency to the expansion of these schemes to provide
land for landless and displaced Africans, as well for population and
political control. The Mwea-Tebere Scheme, later called the Mwea
Irrigation Settlement Scheme, initiated in 1952, and the Million-
Acre Settlement Scheme, initiated in the 1960s, were among the
projects that reflected this urgency (Chambers 1969; Harbeson
1971; Kanogo 1987; Leo 1981). The postcolonial Kenyan govern-
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ment which inherited these land resettlement projects did not
fundamentally alter their logic or objective; in fact, it deepened
them albeit with a patrimonial twist. While the fortunes of these
grand settlement schemes remained debatable, the interrelated
issues of access to land and development continues to occupy the
center stage in Kenya, generating widespread violence as was
evidenced in the 2007 elections.
Interpreted within the framework of colonial developmental-
ism, Lambwe could be seen as yet one more scheme, with one
major geographical difference in its distance far from Nairobi,
designed to push back the frontiers of disease while simultaneously
providing land for the landless. However, in its establishment and
management, LVSS differed significantly from other contemporary
settlement schemes. The policy impetus to resettle this territory
came from those scientists and technicians, the vector-borne
disease parasitologists, the “fly” people, whose mission it was to
control the spread of the tsetse fly and the disease of human
trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness). Their concerns found a
response through the combined work of the Department of
Agriculture and Veterinary Services.2 Working outside the
economic development plans of the 1950s, providing assistance to
develop African settlers as “farmers” was incidental to the need for
human populations to act as blocks to the threat of extended fly
areas and disease transmission. If one were to rely solely upon the
scientific literature of the period, extensive as it is, the LVSS story
is about interaction – human, animal, and tsetse fly – but no more
than that. This aspect of the LVSS history is an important addition
to the historical literature to broaden our understanding of the poli-
tics of settlement as well as the longer history of disease control
and its impact on the social history of Africans (Malowany 2000).
However, the tsetse / trypanosomiasis disease control context is
not enough to explain why settlers came and remained as part of
the LVSS or how they managed their lives within the scheme. This
article develops both contexts: disease control and LVSS manage-
ment by both settlers and administration.
If assessed according to the goals and purpose of other schemes
generated within the settlement / resettlement, population / agri-
cultural development framework, the possibilities for the survival
and success of LVSS were constrained. LVSS was established
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neither on the same rules nor developed in the same manner as
other Kenya schemes. Becoming a LVSS settler did not cost the ten
percent deposit paid by Kikuyu to enter the Million-Acre Scheme,
nor were loans available to potential settlers. The LVSS provided
too little farmland and insufficient irrigation to guarantee sustain-
able farming for the first settlers, let alone their progeny. Instead of
encouraging the integration of LVSS settlers into the larger econ-
omy of the area, as was the case in Mwea, LVSS settlers were forbid-
den to hold jobs or obtain employment outside the scheme, that is,
in relatively close Homa Bay and more distant Kisumu. With these
constraints, it should hardly be a surprise that by 1962, the
Ministry of Agriculture had tersely concluded that “the Lambwe
Valley Settlement Scheme, started in 1952, was a virtual failure by
1959.”3
The “failure” of LVSS was not only one of colonial policy but
also of being outside narrative frameworks of anti-colonial resis-
tance, such as that of Mau Mau, and the grand resettlement
schemes of the central highlands. The Lambwe Valley, situated in
South Nyanza, far from the centre of state power in Nairobi,
equally far from the “white highlands” and those areas reassigned
and resettled by Kikuyu and other African farmers, could provide
no relief to political dissent. Thus, the Lambwe story is not the high
drama of the Rift Valley, of the alienated former “white highlands,”
as it could not involve the various ethnic groups affected or
included in the larger resettlement schemes. It is rather an ordinary
story, from the margins of state-building, of rights and demands,
the process of governing, the attempts to manage settlers for the
good of the Scheme, and the settlers’ voices of complaint and nego-
tiation (Berman and Lonsdale 1992; Kanogo 1987).
If Lambwe was so clearly a failure in terms of agricultural
development, economic growth and political control through reset-
tlement of displaced Africans, what was its purpose? And how can
we explain its relative longevity? We suggest that the rationale for
establishing the LVSS and the changes in rationale over time
provide answers to both. While tsetse and trypanosomiasis control
were responsible for the design and execution of LVSS in 1954, both
the fly and the disease almost disappeared from the records from
the early 1960s. And yet the LVSS continued.
We suggest a rather uncomplicated explanation. The settlers
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who joined LVSS came from neighbouring districts in Tanganyika /
Tanzania and Kenya Nyanza areas, when permitted. Our infor-
mants constantly reinforced their right to live in Lambwe as a
return to their ancestral homelands. Lambwe Valley, scheme or no
scheme, was their land. For these settlers, no matter how unhappy
they were with the management and administration of the scheme,
we suggest that they simply had nowhere else to go. They would
not have been included in the grander land schemes of central
Kenya or the highlands. LVSS settlers had thus returned home or
made a new home on the land allocated to them as part of the LVSS.
Their daily lives on this land become the subject of record. And
what of tsetse control? How did this concern shift from the fore-
ground in the 1950s to the background? Certain ministries believed
LVSS a failure in terms of disease control. Success would demand
what the state was unwilling to invest – increased funding support,
a long term plan, and constant supportive political will. From the
early 1960s, Lambwe Valley was no longer an area of vigilant tsetse
control. Consequently, the site remains endemic for human
trypanosomiasis until today. Disease control remained a national
concern as was made very clear in both funding and policy in the
Mwea Scheme to combat malaria. The decline in state interest for
tsetse control in Western Kenya was closely related to changes in
the organization and policies of a national government, including
declines in funding for vector-borne disease control in areas of little
economic interest.
Economic development, indeed the relationship or the spaces
that existed between the state and the market, were severely
constrained for LVSS settlers. Prohibited from entering a larger
market economy, settlers were left to rely upon and develop their
internal networks and relationships. We suggest that the case of
LVSS allows us to think differently about civil society, a concept
that has been invoked mainly to statist and urban-centred politics.
While civil society is often defined in opposition to a state, or
within the state-market relationship, we propose that the LVSS
settlers displayed civil society “in the making.” Clearly not
autonomous, not part of the market but visibly engaged, we suggest
that this civil society, in which government, local officials and
settlers participated, was remaking the settlement as it evolved
into the 1970s. 
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Population, Disease and the History of the Lambwe
Valley
In the early twentieth century, records report that Lambwe Valley4
had been heavily populated and yet by 1936, the Valley was nearly
devoid of people (Ormerod 1961, 531-35). While debates and anxi-
ety with regard to African population growth and decline is a trope
within African history (Doyle 2006), local explanations are
required for small-scale demographic change. One part of the early
story was the presence of the tsetse fly – a recurring problem in
many parts of the lake region. One of the most widespread human
epidemics struck Uganda / Lake Victoria in the early twentieth
century with devastating mortality rates and social upheaval. Fears
of its recurrence creep into the historical record from that time
forward. In the Lambwe Valley region, early epidemics were
followed by out-migration as the area became more and more diffi-
cult to farm or to meet basic survival needs. Peoples moved to the
neigbouring areas of Tanganyika, settled and farmed there. In cycli-
cal fashion, members of these populations became the returning
migrants of the 1950s (Jennings 2003, 166-67).5
The history of trypanosomiasis has been extensively docu-
mented in the scientific and historical literature (Ford 1971; Giblin
1990; Jordan 1986; Lyons 1991; Malowany 2000). A disease with
two popular names – “nagana” for the disease of cattle and “sleep-
ing sickness” for the human variation – nineteenth and twentieth
centuries accounts of epidemics in sub-Saharan African invariably
cite trypanosomiasis as a burden. In the 1890s, a severe epidemic of
rinderpest wiped out herds of cattle in southern and eastern Africa.
They were replaced by imported cattle, and these herds, lacking
immunity to trypanosomiasis, are thought to have played a strate-
gic role in the shift of this disease from endemic to epidemic status.
Borne by the tsetse fly, trypanosomiasis is a protozoal disease
complex, which presents in two forms in sub-Saharan Africa. The
Gambian variety, found in western and central Africa, presents a
mild and chronic infection that can persist for years. The
Rhodesian variety, present in eastern and southern Africa, causes
acute illness lasting several weeks and is usually fatal without
treatment. The natural hosts of tsetse are wildlife – warthog, bush
pig, buffalo, and others. These animals may acquire prolonged but
symptomless infections. Larger mammals, cattle, in particular,
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some breeds have become trypotolerant, many more remain highly
vulnerable. The tsetse fly itself is highly adaptable and can be found
in forests, riverine areas, and woodland savannas. In times of
animal host scarcity or animal / human proximity, the tsetse, a
zoonotic vector, will bite human hosts.
From 1896 to 1906 in the British Protectorate of Uganda, whose
territory in this period included part of today’s Western Kenya, an
estimated quarter of a million Africans died from sleeping sickness.
In neighbouring Belgian Congo, reports were as high as a half
million deaths in the same period. The British government
mandated the British Sleeping Sickness Commission to conduct
research on the trypanosome in Uganda. The Foreign Office and
The Royal Society of London sent out three researchers – Aldo
Castellani, George Low, and Cuthbert Christy – in 1902. They were
looking for a bacterial cause of the disease and missed identifying
the parasite. With the addition of David Bruce, sent to Entebbe in
1903 from his bench in Ubombo, Zululand where he was investi-
gating “nagana,” and four years earlier had named the parasite
Trypanosoma brucei, the researchers changed tracks. Even though
named after Bruce, who first – Bruce or Castellani – actually iden-
tified the parasite is disputed (Boyd 1973, 93-110). Based on the
research of the team, the Sleeping Sickness Commission reported
the presence of the trypanosome in the cerebro-spinal fluid of
patients diagnosed with sleeping sickness, and the tsetse fly was
identified as the disease vector. Treatment for human victims was
with the arsenical compound, atoxyl, a very problematic treat-
ment. In 1906, the eminent German bacteriologist, Robert Koch
(Echenberg 2001), travelled to German East Africa to conduct ther-
apeutic research on trypanosomiasis, using this drug, atoxyl, inves-
tigating and ultimately proving its role in producing blindness as a
common side effect of treatment. Identifying the vector proved the
next step. In 1903, the tsetse fly, Glossina palpalis, was identified
in Uganda with a second vector, Glossina morsitans identified in
Southern Rhodesia in 1912 (Omerod 1961, 527). For transmission
to humans, there emerged two sub-species of human trypanosomi-
asis – Trypanosoma brucei gambiense and Tranpanosomo brucei
rhodiense. The first produced a chronic form of sleeping sickness
leading to coma and death, endemic in west and central Africa. For
the purposes of this article, we are concerned with the second form,
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found in east Africa, not only for its location but also for its swift
passage from infection to death. If left untreated, this form of sleep-
ing sickness could result in mortality in a few weeks.
Epidemics recorded through the 1930s report approximately
one thousand cases of sleeping sickness per year. Mortality was
high but, if treated early, the disease could be managed. By 1935 T
rhodesiense had moved from southern and south-central Africa to
the Lake Victoria region. Control measures included bush clearing
to create “fly-free” settlements, closing of infected areas,
campaigns for diagnosis, and case treatment. The fly and the
disease moved north to the Busoga region near Kampala, Uganda
with a peak in 1942 of one hundred cases per week (Omerod, 1961).
The infected tsetse flies, now with T rhodesiense rather than the
earlier epidemic of T gambiense, evoked local memories of deaths,
resettlement, and panic among African populations and some colo-
nial officials. The T rhodesiense variation of trypanosomiasis
became endemic in this larger location including Kenya as far as
Narok near the Tanganyikan border (Omerod 1961; Heisch 1948)
Although there is epidemiological debate as to which species co-
exist, are potentially virulent, or can convert from one to another,
in the reality of daily life of African fishermen, cattle owners and
farmers, where tsetse rested, cattle grazed and wildlife coexisted
with human populations, sleeping sickness and nagana were both
threats to African livelihood and lives.
Interest in repopulating Lambwe is recorded as early as 1939.
Buying into the vision of wealth through agricultural development,
the Senior Agricultural Officer, writing to the DC Central
Kavirondo, under the heading “Reconditioning” stated: “Your
money will not only be well spent, but will be the means of creat-
ing greater wealth by better and more crops and grass to the acre,
and give your coming generation of people some hope of inheriting
land which will be a credit to the present generation.”6
In the 1940s, with the independence of India lurking in the
background, Britain woke up to this new phase of the colonial
project. What had been a somewhat reluctant venture became an
active focus on development for decolonization. Colonial officials
in Kenya were well aware of this new level of engagement. The
Colonial Development and Welfare Fund renewed local interests in
economic growth and, post-World War II, the climate was right for
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these programs to be activated.
By the late 1940s, the tsetse fly had taken over – reclaiming the
bush and leaving marginal areas for human settlement or farming.
With early diagnosis and treatment, even in epidemic situations,
mortality rates could be kept low. In 1953, failures of treatment with
tryparsamide and increases in acute infections with resultant
increases in mortality alarmed the medical community. Until 1960,
Rhodesian sleeping sickness cases remained localized in neighbour-
ing Central Nyanza. Reports of cases emerged in South Nyanza in
1960. In spite of vector eradication attempts in adjoining regions, the
tsetse and trypanosome proved adaptable, flexible, and migratory.
From the mid-1930s, we understood the relationship between
the tsetse fly, the animal reservoir, and human interaction. Was
human settlement the best control measure? The Busoga scheme for
tsetse control, just across the Uganda border, was about to close. Why
would Lambwe Valley be seen as a potential success? Perhaps the
optimism of the national project in Kenya, the new tools of residual
insecticides (DDT, Dieldrin, and Malathion) coupled with some
regional successes with tsetse control shored the Scheme’s develop-
ment. The dynamism of the new agricultural policies created under
the Swynnerton Plan should not be underestimated as drivers from
Nairobi. Initiated in 1954, the same year as the Scheme was framed
legally, the Swynnerton Plan addressed African land “problems” by
reforming land tenure, consolidating fragmented holdings, issuing
freehold title, intensifying and developing African agriculture,
providing access to credit, and removing restrictions on growing
crops for export (Bradshaw 1990). It consisted of a three-phase
programme: (1) land adjudication to “phase out” customary tenure;
(2) land consolidation into one block per household to eliminate
small, dispersed parcels, to allow greater specialization, and to real-
ize economies of scale in cash crop production; and (3) land registra-
tion to provide for security of ownership and to establish a land
market. Overall, the aim was to facilitate increased investment and
employment in agriculture and to increase rural incomes and the
“productivity” of land (Okoth-Ogendo 1976, 1981, 1991; Wangari
1991). The Swynnerton Plan was predicated on an assumption that
explicitly “successful” or wealthy African farmers would “be able to
acquire more land and bad or poor farmers less, creating a landed and
a landless class” (quoted in Wangari 1991).
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Politics and the Implementation of the Lambwe
Valley Settlement Scheme
While the official strategies for land reforms and economic produc-
tion provide a framework for understanding the commitment to the
Lambwe Valley Scheme, they do not sufficiently address the poten-
tial challenges of its implementation. The Valley was a tsetse
infested area. It is somewhat isolated, namely not on the path of any
major migration or agri-business venture. There were no gold
mines, few game animals, too many bushes, and so a seemingly
unlikely target for economic development. Identifying the nature of
development to be encouraged in this inhospitable Valley would
generate intense debates among different groups with stakes in the
scheme. The intense negotiations taking place in other parts of
Kenya in the 1950s were between settlers, who owned land ranging
in scale from small dairy farm to enormous, lucrative tea and coffee
plantations located mostly in Highland Kenya and the African
politicians soon to be in government over meeting the need for post-
independence Africans to have productive land. In the colonial
period, settlement for “squatters” as in the Olenguruone scheme
established in the late 1930s, had become, by the late 1940s, sites of
African resistance and government anxiety (Kanogo 1987). 
On the economic front, no less than Creech-Jones, Secretary of
State for the Colonies had called for an “agricultural revolution”
(Cooper 1996, 538 note 136). The colonial governors stated that
Africans had to increase their efficiency, overcome their inertia.
Leading Kenya politicians of the period – Kenyatta and Odinga –
argued and debated over land for the Kikuyu and Akamba.
Participation in the wage economy did not offer an alternative to
owning land. When one revisits the notorious “Three-Fifths Rule”
that African employees – those who worked on the railways, and
civil servants – were to be paid 3/5 of salaries paid to non-Africans,
thrown out by the Lidbury Commission in 1954, wages for Africans
did not become equal to non-Africans. While Tom Mboya organized
courses for trade union leaders in preparation for the transition to
independence, the economic future for labourers looked dim.
If land was the issue, of what value was the Lambwe Valley to
a new Kenya? Kenya land on or near Lake Victoria was simply the
end of the railway line – the passageway into Uganda, a transit area
for goods traded north-south, east-west. Lambwe does lie close to
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the ancestral home of the late Tom Mboya – perhaps some were
planning ahead to reinstate this area to Dholuo-speaking popula-
tions in the way that Akamba and Kikuyu were negotiating theirs.7
If the land itself was seen to be of little economic value to the grand
development schemes of a new Kenya, then we are left with the
presence of the tsetse fly, the disease it could transmit, trypanoso-
miasis, and the long term effects of allowing Lambwe to remain an
endemic site for trypanosomiasis.
The Scheme opened in 1950 with a 42 000 acre allotment: 8 000
acres already inhabited, 6 000 acres of hills and mountain that
could not be inhabited and farmed, thereby leaving 28 000 acres
available for settlement, over five times the original estimate of
productive land. While questions remained as to the number of
settlers that could be managed within the scheme, while keeping
the ranching agenda open, the Agricultural Department realized
they had underestimated the numbers. District Commissioner
Duffy, looking at neighbouring locations, reported they were “over-
populated and overstocked” with the implication that the surplus
population would “be only too glad to spill into Lambwe Valley
once the area had been cleared of tsetse.”8 Upon further investiga-
tion, the Agricultural Department agreed with this “overpopula-
tion scenario” and reduced the land allocation per household to
twenty-six acres. Ranching had given way to crop development.
Questions of governance and authority were not worked out until
after settlement began.
The first settler, unnamed in the record, arrived in February-
March 1951. However, a few months later, the Chiefs of surrounding
locations held their first meeting with colonial officials in Lambwe
Valley on 28 June as an “information meeting to display the limits of
the area to be covered in the scheme,” colonial bureaucratic parlance
for letting the Chiefs know how and where land boundaries would be
set. Until the appointment of a Settlement Officer, a Works
Supervisor (paid by the East African Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis
Research and Reclamation Organisation, heretofore EATTRO) and
the Assistant Agricultural Officer, Mr. Gulf, were made jointly
responsible to the District Team. It is important to note the East
African component of policy-making in this period. Stimulated by
established East African research institutes, borders for research, for
tsetse fly, and for policies of disease control crossed national lines.9
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 05
:11
 28
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
3 
Malowany, Geissler & Lwoba: “Go Back to the Land!” 453
From the Scheme’s inception, there was “considerable
disagreement” between EATTRO and the Agricultural
Department over managing the scheme. The local EATTRO people
thought they should have a major say in the control of the scheme
– as it was a Tsetse Land Reclamation Scheme while Agriculture
wanted to control because the reclamation was done by agricul-
tural settlement. The official Report confirms EATTRO’s position
as it states the original conception was proposed by EATTRO.
Settlers were to be introduced to keep the bush from regenerating
and to be a source of communal labour. The introduction of the idea
that settlement should be used for improved agriculture was the
later proposal from the Agricultural Department.
Five months later, in November 1951, the first Settlement
Officer, Mr Rinacher, was appointed. At this early stage of LVSS,
reports had been received in the DC’s office of thirty unofficial
settlers and complaints that little clearing had been done by the
official settlers. Labour was extremely short. The following month,
December 1951, without consulting the new Settlement Officer, a
new strategy became policy. The DC, in concert with the Chiefs,
said that if Lambwe was not settled by South Nyanza people, the
neighbouring Maragoli and settlers from Central Nyanza would be
invited. If a labour or settler shortage was the problem, local
authorities would simply extend the invitation outside the initial
borders. The response, a year later, was to establish an African Land
Utilization and Settlement Department within the DC’s jurisdic-
tion. As DC, GM Bebb, wrote to the PC Nyanza in Kisumu, in a
secret and confidential memorandum: “Political problems have
arisen in Lambwe Valley.” He summarized the problems as follows: 
(a) Fear in the bordering locations that extra District Africans
will be brought into the valley in large numbers.
(b) Dislike of the proposed boundaries particularly in Kasingunga
and Kaksingiri locations and to a lesser extent East Konyango
and West Nyokal locations.
(c) A general feeling that the Settlement Scheme is being used to
Government’s and not South Nyanza’s interests and that the valley
may well be regarded to (sic) a solution to overcrowding in some
other district.10
DC Bebb’s memorandum is instructive. He explained that the
people of the district – Luo and Suba – understood the importance of
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immediate settlement upon bush clearing and the provision of water
supplies:
It is doubtful if land hunger in the Luo areas of the district is
anywhere at present of such intensity as to provide a ready
surplus population.… Settlement areas have much to
commend them and the Lambwe Valley is extremely fertile but
the African is not unaware that as he has got to live in the
Valley there will be a social change in his life of importance. He
will be allowed only a restricted number of cattle and probably
for some years no cattle at all.… It is quite clear that the
Veterinary authorities are concerned about the dangers of
Tsetse even if fly free barriers are cut and until population pres-
sure on the surrounding country causes substantial elimina-
tion of the bush referred to, this concern is likely to continue.11
Bebb gave voice to the questions and concerns on the minds of the
chiefs: namely, did the government intend to introduce settlement
from District Africans outside the designated areas? More perti-
nently, again, in Bebb’s words, “if so, do they not understand how
this will provoke opposition?”12
Bebb clearly understood local demands and local politics. He
asked the PC if the Scheme could not continue in its present form.
With over £20,000 already spent, he suggested the government
should concentrate on providing water supplies on the North East
side where the population pressure was strongest and thus encour-
age clearing by local effort. In a later memo, the Council definitely
opposed bringing in settlers from the outside. One year later, on 25
October 1954, the PC gave in to the Chiefs’ pressure and the DC
recommendations: “no settlers from other Districts would be
brought in at present.” “External” settlers would only be brought
in from areas of land erosion, which, in effect, expanded the south
end of the project.13
By the end of 1954, the legal document outlining rules for the
settlement scheme had been drafted and approved. Although the
records contain this document in English and Jaluo, it is not at all
clear how the document was produced at that time – consultation,
collaboration, inter-jurisdictional input or central government,
Ministry-level pronouncement.
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The Native Lands Trusts (Lambwe Valley Settlement
Area) Rules, 1954
Implementing the settlement scheme only exacerbated the
tensions between the inherent political and epidemiological chal-
lenges of managing the settlers, their families and livestock and
tsetse control. The directives for the LVSS were drafted in 195414
and, given their clarity and stringency, are quoted verbatim from
the record. Direct authority rested with the District Commissioner
whose task it was to appoint African Advisory Councils as neces-
sary. The DC kept the register of names and was responsible for
ensuring that no person other than those registered would occupy
land, own cattle, or depasture stock. From the records, occupation
or settlement on LVSS was subject to the following conditions:
1. the applicant was to be given a copy of the rules and the applicant
has to understand them; 
2. demarcate and cultivate only land or stock entered in the regis-
ter – any excess may be sold;
3. comply, individually and communally, with all such instruc-
tions (given) by the DC in regard to sound farming practice, includ-
ing land management, and crop and stock husbandry;
4. no subdivision of land – without permission from the Chief
Native Commissioner;
5. no one other than the registered applicant and his registered
family allowed to reside on or cultivate any land;
6. directions from DC re crops or grass to be complied with;
7. “(f) The registered personall(sic) shall occupy and reside upon
such area as may be allocation (sic) to him and shall not engage in
occupations outside the Settlement area except with the permis-
sion of the District Commissioner”;
8. if crops have to be uprooted – no compensation;
9. if no compliance – DC will serve written notice – as a warning –
and if still guilty the settler’s name will be expunged from the regis-
ter – the guilty person plus all of those authorized to occupy with
him the land, etc and required to leave.15
In addition to the above rules which were to be shown to appli-
cants, further administrative directives were kept from the appli-
cants; for example, the plots were never properly surveyed. Thus,
plot size was not disclosed to avoid possible later claims. Cattle,
important to settlers, were not deemed essential to the scheme.
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Only when the Veterinary Department stated the area to be free of
tsetse fly would cattle be allowed – ten per plot. The offer of free
tractor ploughing was time limited to two years post initial settle-
ment. After that time, the compulsion remained but the costs were
to be paid by the settler.16
The non-disclosure of plot size would prove to result in prob-
lems over land ownership for LVSS administration, as seen below.
The Agricultural Department’s initial ranching agenda was clearly
replaced by those of the Veterinary Department. 
How did one become a registered, official LVSS settler?
Following a personal visit to Lambwe, meeting with the Settlement
Officer, a tour of the area, and a selection of the plot, formal regis-
tration was made with the District Officer, in neighbouring Homa
Bay. The applicant was allowed six months to build a house, fence
his land with sisal, and start cultivation. If he failed to complete
these obligations within six months, the plot would be forfeited
and assigned to another settler. The plot would also be forfeited if,
at any time, the plot holder ceased to live on his plot. Unlike other
settlement schemes in the country for which settlers borrowed
funds from the state to buy into the scheme:
There are no fees of any sort attached to this scheme. All we
want are hard working farmers to keep the Valley free from
Tsetse bush by continuously expanding cultivation.17
In spite of the allotment rules institutionalized by the LVSS,
clearing for tsetse fly was far from under control. “Most of the
settlers, legal or illegal in Block III are in open country and so the
settlers are not helping in any way to combat fly.”18 More effective
strategies were required to allocate only
… where tsetse bush has been cleared for settlers to control the
regeneration. In cases where no clearing is done by settlers, paid
labour plots should be arranged so that each settler gets a share
of the bush to control.… It is not necessary to allocate plots in
open country until all bush and cleared bush plots are taken
up.”19
The LVSS, as a tsetse-control program, appeared to be failing.
Government response, at the settlement and District levels,
was to increase control and direction. If LVSS was failing from its
inception, for what reasons was the scheme continued? Nyanza
Province is a great distance from Central Province and central
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government. Clearly, Central Government was focused on building
a national policy for land reclamation, allocation, settlement, and
productivity. Kenya was a settler colony and competing interests in
economic development were entrenched in more than the minds of
those living in Kenya in the 1950s. What would stay – what would
change – how would the power base be negotiated – were questions
at the heart of discussions in Nairobi. Nyanza, in particular South
Nyanza, was a peripheral area which came to the forefront of devel-
opment discussions when its leaders sought to make their political
support visible. South Nyanza, then, was left on its own, and
perhaps it is this opening that accounts for the highly responsive
correspondence undertaken by African settlers in the LVSS. We
must stress that more Africans ignored this scheme than applied.
But of the numbers who did take up the call to settle, their
complaints form a sizeable set of documents in the archives. While
the records also show intense correspondence between the DC and
the Settlement Officer on best farming practice, these were strate-
gies for the long-term and divorced from the settlers’ concerns.
The scheme prohibited settler engagement in a cash economy
outside of self-produced cash crops. Economic success depended
upon the land. What the archives demonstrate with certainty is
that Africans in and around South Nyanza had their own ideas of
what constituted land holding and reclamation. Reports of “unau-
thorised settlers” moving into Lambwe meant that they were
bypassing the registration procedure and the contractual relation-
ship with its multiple terms for land use and, perhaps of equal
importance, land inheritance. At no point in the discussion of the
settlement scheme, do government officials anticipate demo-
graphic growth and needs over time nor do they incorporate the
complex system of marriage – bridewealth – land and cattle
exchanges that were part of everyday life for Africans in this area.
Instead of negotiating with the settlers, officers employed tech-
nological strategies to address the “land problem.” They prepared
contour maps of the area based on an aerial survey drawing up plans
for drainage and roads. Although administrators admitted this
survey would not assist proper Farm Planning, it was considered
enough to begin drainage plans, to prepare the land.20 Unable to
employ the settlers, given the LVSS restrictions, the African Land
Development Unit (ALDEV) Engineer was forced to seek labour
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elsewhere. While he asked for Africans with a Cambridge School
Certificate (CSE) to be employed as surveyors-in-training, the
District Agricultural Officer, John Gurr, responded:
… it is almost impossible in this Province to get hold of men
with Cambridge School Certificates, and that the best we are
likely to do is KASSE [Kenya African Secondary Schools
Examination] … I have succeeded in getting one man with a
good KASSE pass, with a credit in arithmetic, and algebra.21
Finding no one with a CSE, they lowered the annual salary from
£180 to £132 plus “safari allowance.”22 Smyth (Settlement Officer)
placed an advertisement in the local paper, Souti Ya Bamani [sic],23
and hired “under-educated” locals. The irony of hiring local labour
for work that could have been performed by local settlers, who
were cash-poor, must have been seen as illogical by the settlers.
While the survey was undertaken, settlers were reported to be shift-
ing the boundaries set by “beacons,” causing a number of acrimo-
nious letters to be written between the engineer and local colonial
authorities.
Responses to the Scheme and Settler Complaints:
1956-60
Two years into the scheme, its very viability was questioned.24 In a
typical understatement, and speaking for administrators from
many sectors, the Agricultural Officer stated: “I am not happy with
the state of the Lambwe Valley.”25 Although he had sufficient
administrative and management staff – a Settlement Officer, an
Agricultural Instructor, four Assistant Agricultural Instructors and
an African Surveyor as well as a fairly adequate settler numbers
(seven hundred families – acceptably below the target of two thou-
sand families), overall planning was weak and government support
inadequate. First, the surveying system was unsatisfactory in
design, in that the layout was on the square, “irrespective of topog-
raphy which will result in the greatest difficulties in Farm Planning
when this comes about, as well as access to water and access to
roads.”26 A new aerial survey was required for proper planning but
funds were not available. Secondly, he reported the Lambwe Valley,
as part of the larger agricultural Gulf Division, did not get the atten-
tion required for its development.
Seemingly ignoring these concerns, the DC and PC approved
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opening one hundred plots for settlers from Central Nyanza,
outside the initial recruiting the area and thus enlarging the
scheme. From their perspective, the numbers were far from
adequate. Only three new settlers had joined in the previous year
(1956) and instead of increasing overall numbers, the figures report
a drop to 620 from 677 recorded in 1955. While recognizing the
support of the African District Council to meet settler targets, he
expressed overall pessimism for the future of the LVSS:
I have always felt that the pressure on the land in South Nyanza
is relatively so slight that the launching of the Lambwe Valley
Settlement Scheme was 15/20 years premature. The land lies
within the South Nyanza Native Land Unit and therefore is
presumably not available for settlement from other Districts
except with the agreement of the people of South Nyanza as
expressed by the African District Council.…
I think the time has now come when a decision should be
taken as to whether the Scheme is really worth carrying on
even if settlers from Central Nyanza are introduced. A lot of
good money has been thrown after bad, and it is my considered
opinion that the introduction of 100 settlers from Central
Nyanza will not provide the necessary stimulus to persuade
further South Nyanza tribesmen to go in, and that therefore
there is little point in introducing 100 Central Nyanza settlers
unless it is expected that further immigrants from Central
Nyanza will be allowed later on.27
Settlement Officer Massey was unwilling to close the scheme and
instead suggested a controlled migration with Central Nyanza
settlers brought in a dozen at a time – and forcibly integrated into
existing communities. What was meant by forced integration was
left unexplained.
One year later, July 1956, settler numbers were still below
targets: 677 families occupied plots but this figure included families
domiciled on the land prior to the settlement scheme. The pre-
settlers were problematic as they could not be relied upon to stay and
conform to the settlement regulations, “as the present policy of
Block settlement approaches their plots.” Although the SO reasoned
in pejorative terms that “the thought of work involved makes them
a little apprehensive,” there is no record that these inhabitants were
ever brought into the early consultations at the time the scheme was
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devised.28 Pre-settlers were not willing to work the land or clear the
bush according to LVSS regulations for what they already possessed
– their land. The labour that they refused to provide was the
conscripted, contracted labour of the LVSS. 
How then to increase settler numbers to meet LVSS targets?
While the suggestion of settlers from Central Nyanza was accept-
able, the SO thought he could handle only four per month.29 The
discussion was taken to the African District Council (ADC), which
vetoed entry of non-Luo from Marigoli but approved prospective
settlers from Central Nyanza. The ADC, in addition to consulta-
tion with the District Officers, was also becoming increasingly
involved in mediation between settlers and the SO.
In a letter of appeal to Chief Damianus Ajuang of Kasigunga
Location, Smyth, who had replaced Massey as the new Settlement
Officer, reported settler complaints to the Chief:
They object to being registered, as Settlers of Lambwe Valley
Scheme, i.e., signing for the rules, and giving information
required for registration to the Sub-Headman Grado Ogwel….
Settlers originally under your Location refuse to attend Barazas
held by the Sub-Headman Grado Ogwel, but attend Barazas
held at your Office.… One Settler, KILION ALIWA, is
employed by you as a Locational Council member, for
Kasigunga, if he has been selected as Locational Council
Member, by your people in the LVS, he is required as a
Locational member, for the LV Location.30
Smyth, while acknowledging the authority of the Chief and of the
ADC, at the same time realized that conflict resolution was not in
his hands. This did not stop him from issuing a somewhat thinly
veiled threat to go to higher authorities if the Chief was unable to
perform his duties: “I (Smyth) am sure you (sic) help in these
matters and explain to these Settlers, their position, without my
having to request action from the District Commissioner, South
Nyanza.”31 In what could be read as affirmative protest, Chief
Ajuang, who had written other letters in this file in English, replied
to Smyth in Kiswahili that he would speak with his constituents.32
As we have shown, through the 1950s, Lambwe Valley became
the site of competing interests and jurisdictions. African popula-
tions, while subject to the formal administrations, actively
engaged with their own representatives who, as advisors or African
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administrators, formed a parallel governing structure. As the
letters and reports demonstrate, local chiefs responded indepen-
dently to multiple constituent layers from their own location to
councils and wider network. While the LVSS records present these
layers in relief, as a colonial state backdrop, the intense discussion,
activity, and debate taking place on the ground among Africans
speaks to a self-consciously politically astute population. 
In this decade, the competing interests of the Agriculture,
Forestry and Veterinary Departments form one layer of correspon-
dence between Western Province and Nairobi. The central govern-
ment debate centred on whether the Reserve should be
“protective” or “productive.”33 A large part of the Valley was desig-
nated as a Forest Reserve, but experimental work to discover better
suited trees proved to be too expensive to continue and the Lambwe
Forest Station closed down.34 Not to be excluded from debates,
tsetse control did resurface as an issue from the DC’s office. DC de
Warrene Waller, writing to the PC, sought to retain “the existing
Fly Barrier” (his emphasis) in order to discourage tsetse breeding.
For the District and Provincial administrators, there needed to be
discussion as to Lambwe Valley’s future. The DC saw “no further
point in continuing this expensive experiment.” Referring to the
Forest Department’s protective versus productive debate, he wrote:
This to my mind is utter nonsense.… By allowing bush to
generate on the slopes of these hills, which are to the West of
the Fly Barrier, we shall bring the fly into areas to which it has
never been before.35
While agreeing with the challenge of viability, he suggested “[to]
develop the Scheme gradually over the years on a non-cost basis
until such time as, (if ever) a really genuine need for a Settlement
area arises.” With scarce funds available, the need for development
was not present. He suggested a new Administrative Location be
created out of the LVSS with the boundaries of the Settlement
Scheme as the boundaries of the new location. “The creation of this
new location would go hand in hand with the guaranteeing (in
perpetua) of the land rights of the settlers outside the district whom
we have settled in the Lambwe.”36 A new location would place
administrative responsibility on local chiefs and the LVSS regula-
tions could be abandoned.
The Settlement Officer was also frustrated. There had been
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many upsets in the previous years with numerous letters and
memos from the SO to his colleagues stating he received little
support from Chiefs and Headmen. Following a baraza in
September 1956, led by Paul Mboya, then Secretary to the ADC
South Nyanza, the settlers expressed their fears due to “mischevi-
ous interpretation of the Settlement Rules by malicious minded
persons.”37 Smyth attributed these complaints to residual conflict
from those hostile from the beginning of the scheme. According to
Smyth, “there is ample power of eviction for the ring leaders under
the Settlement Rules.” Although he said he had not been informed
personally of criticisms, those on the borders were “definitely
hostile, possibly hoping the Scheme will be a failure ... lip service
paid at Barazas but there it ends.”38
Very early in 1958 an inquiry was launched into the LVSS with
a full Report published in February. With 75 000 acres in the Valley,
estimated to hold 2 000 settler families, the 530 registered settler
families were far from the target. Because of this inquiry, during
which investigators talked with the settlers, we have a very inter-
esting record of their complaints. Handwritten letters were sent to
the ADC and to the various administrative authorities.39 Two
letters in particular pointed to problems with terms of registration
and settlement and to internal corruption within the local African
administration. 
Mr Boaz Owino, writing from the Nyanza Provincial General
Hospital, Kisumu, applying for land, stated: “I am landless and I
have two brothers and my cousin who are married and landless
too.” But the DO, M.D. Jackson, responded with the legal position
stating:
25 acre plots at Lambwe are only given to people who are will-
ing to settle permanently, i.e. you would have to resign from
your job and come and live in Lambwe if you were allocated a
plot. Alternatively you would have to send your wife and chil-
dren to live here permanently.
Jackson then restated in full the procedure for prospective settlers
to register, establish themselves on an allocated plot – and those
conditions which could lead to forfeiture. Jackson concludes
almost verbatim from previous administrators’ correspondence:
“There are no fees of any sort attached to this scheme. All we want
are hard working farmers to keep the Valley free from Tsetse bush
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by continuously expanding cultivation.”40 The settlers’ letters, on
the other hand, were personal and explicit. Mr Oreng wrote directly
to a number of officials inquiring astutely about taxes.41 He tells
his story that, in 1958, he was told by his Headman to pay a
personal tax of 52/- and yet the proper personal tax should have
been 50/-. He asks: “Where has [sic] these two shillings gone to?
And if at all they were paid in government Personal Tax, Why did
we not get any tickets?” (receipts). Two years later, the Headman
announced that those who had not paid their personal tax were now
fined 67/50.
And we paid it and there was NO any ticket as we paid in
1958…. The reason why we are now telling you all these words.
These arrangements has [sic] been going on for Four years. In
every year in June our Headman do say that. Those people who
has [sic] not paid their personal Tax, They should be fined s7/50
shs. But the reason why we are afraid not paid it … We are
paying it. We know very well the…people who are late with thy
[sic] Personal Tax.
At the opening of this letter, Oreng uses his financial leverage
and threatens to pay elsewhere: “We people in Lambwe Valley we
should pay our Personal Tax in Kaguinga Location.… If you cannot
arrange these things properly which are going wrong in
Lambwe.”42 Mr Oreng’s letter then lists the names and amounts
paid of seven settlers – those who paid directly to the Headman.
Oreng wanted to be seen as a man of knowledge and political
action. In his last paragraph: “Please ask Headman and his clerk
where this money has gone to? Because these people who paid all
these amount they are really complaining.” Oreng thus claims to
be speaking not only for himself – but for others in the community
who perhaps do not have the language skills to write to the author-
ities. 
The SO, not in a reply to Oreng, but in a memo to the file,
acknowledged the above “allegations.” Smith recorded: 
On enquiry it was found that all these allegations were true.
Grado was taking money (allegedly in part payment) from these
men on pay days. 
Told to return all money and not to collect any more. Either
a man pays the full amount and gets a tax or Rate receipt or he
is prosecuted.
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This is a very serious offence on the part of Grado and I am
deeply inspicious [sic] of his motives.
To be watched closely in future.43
What these letters and records reveal are the internal anxieties,
challenges and ultimately the confidence of the African “body
politic” to challenge the system for a fair deal. 
There were also problems with regard to work or control over
outside labour activities. It would have been almost impossible for
a new settler to wait for a year to develop a cash crop and live with-
out any form of income. In the 1958 inquiry, of the ten registration
forms included as part of the Report, fifty percent of the applicants
list that they are employed – in a variety of occupations – none of
them farming – three butchery, one duka (shops), one seremala
(unclear in the document). Wage employment was in clear viola-
tion of the terms of settlement.44 Were these butchers and shop
owners established on the Scheme? Were they working in Homa
Bay? How did the children of the first settlers support themselves
as they grew older? Did those who self-define as farmers not see
this as an occupation? There are no answers to these questions in
the archival records of the 1960s, but the increasing number of
complaint letters into the 1970s reflects an increasingly complex,
politicized, and engaged settler population.
From Settlement to Tourism: 1960s-1970s
The complaints registered through the 1958 inquiry might have led
to better administrative government. Perhaps they did on site, but,
if so, the records are silent. What surfaces is a Nairobi-based vision
for Lambwe Valley constructed by the new, post-independence
Members of Parliament.45 Earlier plans for tsetse control and agri-
cultural development disappeared from the agenda and were
replaced with discussions over the economic opportunities of
tourism and game parks:
Reference the above (re: game sanctuary near Lambebwe Valley
[sic] about which I have held verbal talks with the Ministry of
Information as well as with yours along with the South Nyanza
district authorities – I wish to urge the Government to develop
this area effectively so as to attract the tourists from abroad to
this part of the country.46
Mr Agar, MP, continues in his letter to discuss the attractions of the
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region and the problems of poaching and destruction of the crops by
game. Is this not the area that only ten years earlier was to be “game
controlled,” to effect control of the tsetse animal reservoir? Given
the frequent complaints about crop destruction by wild pigs, the
two decades of game control were clearly ineffective.
Mr. C.Z.O Athieno, in his letter to the DO and DC of 14
November 1961, complained about the devastation of crops due to
wild pigs and his fear of famine for the following year. Speaking for
his neighbours as well, Mr Athieno said they were not sleeping at
night as more than one person had to stay up to guard the four-acre
cultivation. The “women do guarding work early in the night and
the men take over later in the night.” He continued:
If it becomes the burden of a woman to guard the crops during
the night leaving children alone in the house it becomes a
regratable [sic] state of affairs.
I understand that the Government is now spending thou-
sands of pounds and time in combating famine in the other
areas of Kenya. Surely something must be done immediately
about this matter?
I do not know the policy of the Government regarding
Lambwe Valley whether it is to be both a settled area as well as
a game park. To me it would appear that the games [sic] or the
settlers must give way.47
Lambwe settlers thus demonstrated their knowledge of national
politics and policies. Interestingly, DO Jackson ignored any refer-
ence to the larger picture and responded saying they had organized
pig hunts and “I myself am going out to shoot pigs this evening.”
He continued that they wanted to see the wild pigs wiped out but
did not want settlers to organize pig hunts outside their shambas
without a game scout being present to protect other game
animals.48 Jackson ignored the central question as to government
intent – settlement versus game park. Debates were taking place –
but not in the public view – and, interestingly, not only in Nairobi. 
In August 1963, two years later, the County Council of South
Nyanza “unanimously resolved to declare Lambwe Valley a game
reserve as was originally suggested in the meeting of the South
Nyanza Agricultural and Natural Resources Committee on 15
October 1962.” In this meeting it was also decided that the removal
or killing of game would not be allowed without prior approval by
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the County Council of South Nyanza.49 Mr Agar, with significant
local support, brought the game park issue to the attention of the
Minister. 
Although in most instances local authorities had managed to
stay outside the watch of central government, these decisions,
which had national ramifications, raised alarms. For Nairobi and
Central Government, the concern was not with the shift itself from
settlement to game park, but one of proper governance and author-
ity. If this transition took place, who would assume authority to
direct the change and, one must assume, the economic benefits?
In a letter written on 24 September 1963, two weeks after Mr
Agar’s letter to the Minister, the Chief Game Warden N.S.
Sandeman stepped in. He informed the South Nyanza Council they
had no legal authority to pass a resolution regarding wildlife,
because the wildlife belonged to the state. Sandeman wrote:
In regard to the formation of a Game Reserve in the Lambwe
Valley, you may rely on the Game Department assisting you in
this project in any way it can provided that the appalling inci-
dence of poaching from which the wildlife of the Lambwe
Valley has suffered for so long is firmly and permanently
suppressed and it is realised that it is most unlikely that owing
to its situation, a Lambwe Valley Game Reserve can ever be
“revenue earner” for your County Council.50
The game park proposal dominated discussion among local and
provincial authorities for the next six to seven years. To assist in
planning, Council members visited tourist sites and game parks in
central Kenya, and met with other game park advisory boards, but
nothing really developed on the Lambwe Valley site. The Game
Reserve was declared, the Game Park proposal passed but there
were no funds from central government to develop the scheme.
Over this same period, LVSS settlers continued to write about
their internal problems and we enter the 1970s with attempts to
consolidate decision-making and thus, power. In 1971, the Lambwe
Advisory Council (LAC) was established whose members included
the District Officer and assistant, one chief, two sub-chiefs (west
and east Lambwe), nine members from Lambwe (including in 1971
one woman, Mrs Esther Asino). As this Committee had power to
allocate and withdraw land allotments, they were also the major
recipients of settler complaint letters.51
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Reimagining and Reconceptualizing the Lambwe
Valley in the Postcolonial Era 
As the number of settlers increased over time, from fifty in 1950 to
over five thousand by 1970, so also did complaint letters in both
number and breadth of issues. While most letters addressed land
boundaries and disputes, the community was becoming increas-
ingly politically active, involved and vocal. It is not clear from the
record how much authority the Settlement Officer held in this
decade as the responses to complaints came primarily from the
office of the District Commissioner. The settlers’ letters bypassed
the Settlement Officer, with the settlers writing directly to the DC
for a hearing. They realized that some of the problems they faced
were as a result of the LVSS contract which the Settlement Officer
was obliged to uphold and they would have to appeal to a higher
government level to be heard.
While the LVSS settlement terms had forbidden entry into a
cash economy, the administrators had not planned for the inter-
community trading and business that became the basis of an infor-
mal economy. In many instances, settlers purchased labour with
payment in cattle or with a portion of the land allotment or with
the promise of land use. These problems could never have been
brought before the Settlement Officer, but those on the LAC under-
stood the problems of their neighbours and were willing to enter-
tain their protests. For example, “Having paid compensation of
sh.450.00 for labour on the part of Bolo Waringa, the said recipient
refused to hand over the piece of land compensated for to the giver,
Hazron Anyango.”52 If there was a need for further evidence, the
Committee called the complainant and witnesses to appear before
the Committee.
DO Makokah wrote to the DC on 13 September 1971 to report
that the card system used for registration had been stopped. He
noted, “This has led to much confusion and unnecessary argu-
ments by antagonists before the Advisory Council.” Without the
registration cards, the Advisory Council made decisions at one
meeting only to revise them at the next. Of perhaps personal polit-
ical importance was DO Makokah’s concern that the “antagonists”
had taken their complaints “up to the PC’s office.” Are these inter-
nal anxieties over local versus provincial government authority,
power, and economic control? 
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Settlers clearly understood the terms of settlement. They
wrote to the Committee with very detailed information on how
inherited land had been registered, for example. Why, then, with
representatives on the Committee, and a clear structure of how to
proceed within the terms of settlement was there such dissatisfac-
tion with the process? By 1971, adding both expense and another
layer of legal involvement, complainants began to engage lawyers
to act on their behalf. 
Engaging lawyers required cash. How then did settlers engaged
in a cash economy?
Although not permitted to work outside Lambwe, the records
clearly show not all settlers submitted to these terms. The zoolo-
gist, C.S. Rodrigues, complained that while “several plots in the
Roo Valley … have been claimed and marked out … no effort has
been made to cultivate them, the owners being away most of the
time.”53 Thus, some of these men would have had to work outside.
Mr Asino had registered plots for each of his sons but not all were
acquired through the Settlement Officer. Once this was discovered,
Mr Asino had to formally register the plot and also then provide the
labour required under the terms of settlement. As more plots were
required, the push to extend the boundaries of the Settlement area
became a problem. Planning in the 1950s had also not taken into
account demographic growth and familial obligations.
In a report to the DC from the District Veterinary Officer sent
to hold a baraza in the Roo Valley in August 1971, in order to
convince the inhabitants of the importance of extending settle-
ment into the valley, there was clear and stated opposition. Mr
Johnson Onyulo, described as “an accepted spokesman for the audi-
ence” stated to the assembled peoples:
We are the descendants of the original occupants of this valley
who lived here before they were driven out by tsetse flies. We
have agreed on the existing demarcation of the land amongst
ourselves and we would not agree to any further settlement in
the valley. We want the Land to be adjudicated and registered
according to the present demarcation so that we may obtain
title deeds.
With title deeds we shall take loans individually and
develop our shambas individually.… We will choose our own
line of development … and this only after land registration.
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… Most importantly we want water in Makende.…We
propose to begin our own harambee water project but request
that rather the water should be provided first and contributions
be made afterwards as loan repayments.
Then will we be able to obey the Mzee’s call to “go back to
the land.”54
The Roo Valley dweller did not stop with this meeting. In a hand-
written letter to the District Agricultural Committee, Benedict J.
Oloo wrote on behalf of a group of “about 200 villagers” requesting
water and surveyors to demarcate and register the land. With land
title, these farmers could borrow from a bank or directly from the
government, options not available twenty years earlier:
The suggestion is that we remain firm as we had talked to the
Veterinary Officer in August. That we need no ranching at all
but settlement area. As there is no land left where such projects
would be done, unless the above villagers are all removed. And
if removed where will they go? 55
As of March 1972, no further land allocation was allowed as part of
the Lambwe Valley Settlement Scheme.56 While land transfers or
sales were permitted, undefined plot boundaries continued to be a
problem. Four months later, approximately 1 217 plots were demar-
cated, but the two Assistant Chiefs stated they had no idea exactly
how many plots there were. According to the register, 1 037 plots
were legally allocated and approximately 180 illegally occupied.57
Many letters were filed under the term, Ingonga, the name
given to the earlier colonial government policy which stated that
each plot would comprise fifty acres. People complained that fifty
acres were too big to be cleared and developed by a single man.
Then the acreages were reduced to twenty-five each and maps
made on this basis. In 1962, Tom Mboya advocated the idea of a
person being allowed to acquire as much land as he was able to
develop. Then, people started obtaining more land by acquiring
several plots each. This system has caused chaos in the numbering
of plots. The sizes of some plots have been “unduly increased and
some plots have been sub-divided.”58 Further problems came from
adjoining locations whose Chiefs supported the expansion of land
holding into the settlement area: 
It is extremely imprudent for an administrator to brew trouble
in a settlement Area next to his reserve sublocation as you are
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prone to doing. Do not be surprised if I, the DO, Mbita, prose-
cute you individually or you and your henchmen collectively
under Lambwe Rules. You better concentrate on the develop-
ment of your home and of your land.
In spite of the land pressure, the Game Reserve remained protected,
under the new Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, overseen at the
local level by the Game Warden-Nyanza. As the Assistant Game
Warden of Lambwe, informed a potential settler, “anybody found
practising any human activity within the Game Reserve will be
dealt with accordingly. Please comply.”59
What was to be done for settlers whose land was appropriated
as part of the newly-established Game Reserve? In May 1972, one
such person, Mr Owino, applied for land in Lambwe, stating he had
a piece of twenty-five acres taken by the Game Reserve.60
Added to multiple land problems were the ongoing issues of
tsetse control, under the administration of the Veterinary Service
Division, Tsetse Survey and Control. In spite of central govern-
ment’s waning interest, tsetse control came back on the agenda in
1974. Labourers had managed to continue bush clearing, but the
farmers were not cultivating the land nor were they removing the
bush stumps and roots to prevent bush regeneration. Lack of suffi-
cient land cultivation posed two threats for farmers: first, with the
return of tsetse flies would come a resurgence of sleeping sickness
and second, wild pigs that could live in the regenerated bush would
damage crops. The Roo Valley, focus of a new set of complaint
letters, was one of the most fertile areas of the entire Lambwe
Valley area. According to administrators, the potential for farming
was high. The Roo and Gwassi Valleys bordered the Game Reserve
and in both areas settlement was patchy. Questions arose with
regard to absentee owners – connecting, perhaps the challenge of
demographic growth, increasing pressures to be part of a cash econ-
omy and diminishing land holdings and production. While the files
hold numerous letters to the DO to address these concerns, there
was no response. The DO was more directly involved in land allo-
cations and payments.61
As of 1974 there were fourteen dams in Lambwe Valley; ten had
been constructed by individual farmers. Only four of the fourteen
held water for the year – some dams existed only as shallow depres-
sions where proper dams used to exist. At this point, the Ministry
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of Agriculture proposed that £13 000 be spent on dam construction.
The money would be spent to renovate ten of the dams and
construct six new dams – equally positioned in the Lambwe Valley
settlement area and three in the Game Reserve. There were fears
expressed that these dams may have had to have been built on land
where there were farms, so requiring further expense in compensa-
tion. But the problem not mentioned was that no more land was
available in Lambwe Valley. This problem became of vital impor-
tance when the Magistrate awarded compensation in 1975 to
settlers whose land had been taken in the 1960s (some in 1966 and
others in 1969) by the Game Reserve. The Magistrate ruled that the
people should be given land to replace what was taken from them.
But there was no more land. 
The archives record letter after letter from settlers in the LV
over land holding rights. In addition, the District Officer was
charged with malpractice in that he collected taxes from residents
and did not provide government receipts. He took payments from
“Tanzanian Ujamaa runaways”62 for land to settle next to the
Game Reserve and the settlers were told by the Game Department
they were illegal. These settlers were then tried at the Homa Bay
Law Courts. Settlers from the first group in 1959 complained that
the DO Mbita and an Asst Chief Sikri were selling parts of plots
secretly. “My appeal to you and the Government is that the atmos-
phere at this place (Sikri) is explosive and unless it is rested [sic], in
time, more serious consequences are bound to develop in the very
near future,” indicated a typed letter from a very politically astute
Mr Zadock Odanga, which was sent directly to the PC and copied
to the DC, the Division Police and their MP.63
By May 1975, the local MP, A.J.L Okuku Ndiege, was brought into
the negotiations. In a letter from Ndiege to the DC he stated: “I am
getting rather concerned at the increasing number of boundary
disputes in the scheme.” He asked for a meeting to review the “whole
Lambwe situation.”64 In his second letter of that date, he warned the
DC that the government grant of K25 000 for the development of
Lambwe Valley, from the Ministry of Agriculture, included K13 000
for dams, K10 000 for insecticides and K2 000 for “maintenance of
stations” would be returned to the Treasury five weeks later – June
1975 – unless construction began immediately.65 Political criticism
had turned into economic leverage from the local to the central state.
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Conclusion
Correspondence among all levels of government, between settlers
and their advisory committees, interspersed with increasingly
obfuscating letters from lawyers representing one side or another,
attest to the multiplicities of roles, identities, frameworks, gover-
nances, and voices of all participants. No one language could guide
or dominate the narrative as the political participation shifted from
the administrative and scientific silos of the 1950s to a Tower of
Babel in the 1970s. Although we end this part of the story in 1975,
Lambwe Valley remains of political and economic interest, accord-
ing to the shifts in national concerns. Ruma Park, Kenya, would be
the next imagined vision for Lambwe Valley taking this very
provincial outlier to the status of a proposed National Park. As an
endemic site, Lambwe Valley continues to be an epidemiological
curiosity in terms of tsetse control. Most importantly, it remains
home to the descendants of settlers and their families who remem-
ber tsetse and sleeping sickness and those involved in its control.
While tsetse control and sleeping sickness provided the overarch-
ing umbrella under which the Lambwe Valley Settlement Scheme
was constructed, the activities of the communities involved over
the time of the scheme demonstrate the wealth of investigations of
everyday life, politics and negotiations that often remain hidden
under the shadows and narratives of “big” government, particu-
larly in this period of transition from colony to nation. With thanks
to those settlers who voiced their many complaints in interviews
and records, we have been able to explore the complex textures of
their lives, their active agency and creative, if not subversive,
engagement in the process of governance.
Notes
1 An exception to schemes developed in response to soil conservation
concerns, the 1934-37 deportations of the Talai clan and others to the
Gwassi location in South Nyanza, contiguous with Lambwe Valley, to
demonstrate political control over Kipsigi dissidents, speaks to a longer
relationship between the Lambwe Valley and settlement. The historiog-
raphy is extensive. See Anderson (1993) and Hughes (2005) for contextu-
alized accounts within the long history of squatters, political resistance
and links to contemporary struggles. 
2 From 1946-1960, ALDEV, the African Land Development Program,
administered the funding and development of settlement schemes.
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Lambwe Valley was scheduled to begin in 1950.
3 Chambers (1969, 7), citing as reference: African Land Development in
Kenya, 1946-62, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Water
Resources, Nairobi, 1962, 178-81.
4 KRC DN 2/20 “History of Lambwe Valley. Extracts from Agriculrural
[sic] Department Files.”
5 Jennings’ research on development and crisis in Tanzania in the 1960s
and the “extension of central government control” in the adjoining North
Mara District should be further investigated as a rationale for the return of
former “Kenyan” African farmers to Lambwe Valley. 
6 KNA DC/KSM/1/3/91: Development Scheme, 1951-64.
7 Interview, John Obande Apot, 15/07/05, “Mbuya Tom emane olande,”
Tom Mboya announced that he required people to come and settle in
Lambwe; DC/KSM.1.3.91: Development Scheme, 1951-64.
8 KNA DC/KSM/1/3/91: Development Scheme, 1951-64.
9 The various research institutes based in Entebbe, Uganda and Amani,
Tanganyika/Tanzania for tropical disease control – tryps, onchocerciasis,
malaria – recognized porous borders, remapped regions to ignore national
frontiers. Their intersections and scientific imaginings are being explored
in Geissler and Malowany’s current research.
10 KRC DN/2/20 1953. Secret and confidential, DC Office South Nyanza, 
1 Sept 1953 to PC Nyanza.
11 KRC DN/2/20 1953. Secret and confidential, DC Office South Nyanza, 
1 Sept 1953 to PC Nyanza.
12 KRC DN/2/20 1953. Secret and confidential, DC Office South Nyanza, 
1 Sept 1953 to PC Nyanza. 
13 KRC DN/2/20 1953. Secret and confidential, DC Office South Nyanza, 
1 Sept 1953 to PC Nyanza.
14 KRC DN/2/20 1953. Settlement Area – South Nyanza District; in
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15 KRC DN/2/20, 194.
16 Correspondence P.D. McEntee, DC Central Nyanza to the Settlement
Officer, 1954
17 KRC DC/HB/2/6/39- filed as 23.11.60 AGR.11/2/123.
18 B.J. Duffy, Field Officer EATTRO, Lambwe Valley, Report, “The Lambwe
Valley Settlement Scheme and the Tsetse Fly (G.pallidipes).” February 1955, 5.
19 KRC BV/3/575 filed also as A/DEV/1/3/37 13 May 1955, Ag Asst
Director of Agriculture, Nyanza Province to PC, Nyanza Province,
Kisumu. 
20 KRC BV/575. 8 July 1955, Ag Asst Director of Agric, NP to DC South
Nyanza, Kisii, Lambwe Valley Survey, Filed as A/SURV/1/303 DC
records Kisii.
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24 Letters to be found in the following files: KNA DC/HB/2/2/58 Lambwe
Valley General Correspondence; KNA DC/HB/2/6/39 General
Correspondence Lambwe Locational Advisory Council, 1958-61; KNA
DC/HB/3/1 District Settlement Schemes, 1958-59. 
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Valley,” 168.
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20 November 1961.
49 KNA DC/HB/2/2/58. Lambwe Valley General Correspondence, Admin.
County Council of South Nyanza meeting notes on the 13-15 August
1963.
50 KNA DC/HB/2/58. Correspondence to the Clerk of the Council.
51 KRC DN2/3 Lambwe Settlement Scheme, 8.12.1970-13.10.1972. All
complaint letters are in this file.
52 KNA DC/HB/2/6/39, LAC Minutes, 2.
53 KNA KW/13/15 Filed as AGR 2/1, copied in this file, 224. This renam-
ing reflects the interest in creating a game park out of one section of
Lambwe Valley, where the roan antelopes were prominent.
54 KNA DC/HB/2/6/39LAC Minutes. 
55 KNA DC/HB/2/6/39LAC Minutes, 18.10.71.
56 KRC DN/2/3 Letter DO to Mr Elisha Akech Chieng [sic], 13 March
1972.
57 KRC DN/2/3 /LVSS 17/7/72, typed, outlines problems from Ingonga.
58 KRC DN/2/3 /LVSS 17/7/72, 1.
59 KRC DN/2/3 /LVSS 17/7/72, LVSS, 192.
60 KRC DN/2/3 /LVSS 17/7/72, LVSS, 192.
61 KRC DN/2/4 LSS 1974-76.
62 KRC DN/2/3 LVSS 1974-76.
63 KNA KW/13/29 filed as AGR.2/19, May 1975.
64 KNA KW/13/29 filed as AGR.2/19, May 1975.
65 KNA KW/13/29 filed as AGR.2/19, May 1975.
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